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Neoliberal Governance of States:
The Role of Competitiveness 
Indexing and Country Benchmarking
Tore Fougner
This article engages in a critical analysis of two of the most influential 
contemporary economic publications – namely, the  competitiveness 
reports published annually by the World Economic Forum and the 
International Institute for Management Development. Drawing on 
Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality, it emphasises the 
 governmental work that these reports do in relation to ongoing efforts 
aimed at governing states in a neoliberal fashion. In and through com-
petitiveness indexing and country benchmarking, they are argued to 
contribute not only to constitute states as flexible market subjects, but 
also to guide their ‘rational’ conduct thus constituted. Acknowledging 
that there is nothing natural or given about states striving to improve 
their ‘national competitiveness’, the article concludes with some broader 
reflections on the future prospects for neoliberal governance of states.
Keywords: competitiveness reports, global governmentality, neoliberal governance
Introduction
The annual competitiveness reports published by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) and the International Institute for Management Development 
(IMD) are often heralded and celebrated as being among the most impor-
tant economic publications in today’s world. While this might be the case, 
the reports being important should not be confused with them being inno-
cent sources of neutral knowledge regarding the economic conditions of 
countries worldwide. Rather, they both can and should be seen as playing 
a central role in contemporary efforts to govern states in accordance with a 
neoliberal rationality of government. In more specific terms, they do this by 
contributing both to the constitution of states as flexible and manipulable 
subjects with a rationality derived from arranged forms of entrepreneur-
ial and competitive behaviour, and to give shape to their actions as such 
I would like to thank Ayça Kurtoğlu, Jeremy Salt, Paul Williams, the anonymous 
reviewers and the Millennium Editorial Board for their insightful and helpful 
comments on earlier drafts.
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 market subjects from a distance. Importantly, the latter action on the part of 
the WEF and the IMD guides state conduct not in any direction, but in a par-
ticular one providing favourable conditions for mobile firms and  capital.
In a scholarly context, the article connects with an emerging body of 
literature exploring the relevance of Michel Foucault’s problematic of 
‘governmentality’ beyond the state level.1 In this connection, it should 
immediately be pointed out that the term ‘governmentality’ is currently 
used in at least two different ways. First, it is used with reference to
‘a form of [political] power whose logic is not the defense of territory or 
the aggrandisement of the sovereign but the optimisation of the health 
and welfare of the population’.2 While Foucault identified elements of 
such ‘biopower’ in the doctrine of raison d’état, its mature form coincided 
with the emergence of liberalism in the eighteenth century. Second, in 
continuity with Foucault’s earlier conception of ‘power/knowledge’, 
 governmentality is used more generally with reference to ‘how governing 
always involves particular representations, knowledges, and  expertise 
regarding that which is to be governed’ – irrespective of who or what is 
being subjected to government.3
While Foucault’s work on governmentality focused on government 
within states, its potential relevance beyond this was recognised by some 
of the English-speaking social theorists who did much to bring it to the 
attention of a wider academic community. According to Nikolas Rose 
and Peter Miller, for instance, the governmentality problematic applied 
‘as much to geo-political issues as to those within any national territory’.4 
With reference to warfare and colonialism, they argued that ‘in geo-
political relations too … the state should first of all be understood as a 
complex and mobile resultant of the discourses and techniques of rule’.5 
For his part, Barry Hindess has argued that there is an intimate connec-
tion between ‘government within states and the government of states 
themselves within the international arena’, and that the whole modern 
1. ‘Governmentality’ was the focus of Foucault’s 1977–8 and 1978–9 lectures 
at the Collège de France. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures 
at the Collège de France, 1977–1978 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), and 
The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). See Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule 
in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999); Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley and  Mariana 
Valverde, ‘Governmentality’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2 (2006): 
83–104.
2. Wendy Larner and William Walters, ‘Globalization as Governmentality’, 
Alternatives 29 (2004): 496.
3. Ibid. For a further discussion of these two uses of the governmentality con-
cept, see Dean, Governmentality, 16ff.
4. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, ‘Political Power beyond the State: Problema-
tics of Government’, British Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (1992): 178.
5. Ibid.
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state system can be seen ‘not only as regulating the conduct of states, 
and indeed as constituting them, but also as a dispersed regime of gover-
nance covering the overall population of the states concerned’.6
From within the discipline that has long since claimed the domain 
‘beyond the nation-state’ as its own special preserve, Michael Dillon 
argued some time ago that ‘that which international relations takes as its 
object domain of knowledge … can be reinterpreted as exhibiting many 
of the features of the operation of governmentality’ – in that:
political power is exercised globally today through a profusion of shifting 
alliances between many diverse authorities in knowledgeably derived 
pro jects and enterprises designed to effect self-government in manifold 
aspects of the political, economic, and social behaviour of populations as 
well as of individual conduct.7 
While Dillon’s main concern has been with the ‘biopolitics’ of global 
liberal governance,8 other scholars have drawn on Foucault’s govern-
mentality problematic in analyses of intergovernmental organisations, 
international migration, the international refugee regime, regionalism, 
globalisation, global civil society and non-governmental organisations.9
In this ‘global governmentality’ context, and beyond the novel empiri-
cal focus on competitiveness indexing and country benchmarking, the 
present study is quite distinct in at least two ways. First, in spite of the 
partial blurring of the distinction between subjects and objects of gover-
nance that inheres in the governmentality perspective, it breaks with the 
state-centrism that characterises most International Relations work on 
governmentality by treating states primarily as objects rather than sub-
jects of governance. This said, it will nonetheless become clear that the 
neoliberal governance of states analysed in this article both connects with 
how states are engaged in efforts to govern the world political economy 
in accordance with a neoliberal rationality of government, and feeds into 
governance of a neoliberal kind within states. Although the article pri-
marily employs the term governmentality in its more general sense, it 
follows that the governance of states in question links up with biopoliti-
cal projects at both the global and nation-state levels.
6. Barry Hindess, ‘Neo-liberal Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies 6, no. 2 (2002): 
129; ‘Divide and Rule: The International Character of Modern Citizenship’, 
 European Journal of Social Theory 1, no. 1 (1998): 65–6.
7. Michael Dillon, ‘Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of 
the “New World Order” to the Ethical Problematics of the World Order’, Alterna-
tives 20, no. 3 (1995): 340–1.
8. Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, ‘Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, 
Security and War’, Millennium 30, no. 1 (2001): 41–66.
9. Wendy Larner and William Walters, eds, Global Governmentality: Governing 
International Spaces (London: Routledge, 2004); Michael Merlingen, ‘Foucault and 
World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory 
to the European and Beyond’, Millennium 35, no. 1 (2006): 181–96.
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Second, in contrast with existing studies that treat states as objects of 
governance,10 the governmental practices analysed in this article con-
cern actions on the part not of supranational authorities, but rather of
so-called private actors. Against this background, the article not only 
makes a novel governmentality contribution to studies on ‘private global 
governance’, but also provides a corrective to neo-Gramscian analyses 
of states being constrained by the structural power of transnational capi-
tal in the contemporary world political economy.11 Rather than seeing 
inter-state locational competition as a product of negative or discipli-
nary power, the present article highlights how the WEF and the IMD 
are contributing positively and productively to enlist states in a competi-
tive market game. In the empirical case at hand, a key strength of the 
 governmentality perspective concerns how it enables both the identifica-
tion of power in a set of seemingly neutral economic publications, and 
the location of this power practice within a wider set of reflections on 
state governance.
The section to follow provides a brief outline of the Foucauldian con-
ception of neoliberalism that informs the analysis. In the second section, 
the general argument that states are increasingly subjected to a form of 
neoli beral governance is made with reference to both the salience of the 
discourse on national competitiveness in contemporary reflections on 
state governance, and the programmatic thinking found in influential 
strands of public choice theory. Within this broader context, the third 
section analyses the governmental role played by competitiveness index-
ing and country benchmarking in contemporary efforts to govern states 
in accordance with a neoliberal rationality of government. The article 
concludes with some reflections on the future prospects for neoliberal 
governance of states.
Neoliberalism as a Rationality of Government
Neoliberalism is a highly contested concept in contemporary public 
and scholarly debates. Not only are there many different conceptions 
of  neoliberalism,12 but some scholars even argue that ‘there is no such 
thing as neoliberalism’.13 Leaving debates on both the existence and 
10. E.g. William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, 
Governmentality and European Integration (London: Routledge, 2005).
11. E.g. Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary 
 Neoliberalism’, Millennium 24, no. 3 (1995): 399–423.
12. Philip G. Cerny, ‘Embedded Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic 
Paradigm’, Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 2, no. 1 (2008): 1–46; Wendy 
Larner, ‘Neoliberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality’, Studies in Political 
Economy 63 (2003): 5–26.
13. Clive Barnett, ‘The Consolations of Neoliberalism’, Geoforum 36, no. 1 (2005): 
7–12.
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meaning of neoliberalism aside, I will here conceive of it as a  rationality 
of government. With government understood as ‘action upon other 
actions’14 – that is, a form of power deliberately aimed at shaping or  guiding 
the conduct of  others through their capacity to regulate their own beha-
viour – governmental rationalities refer to ways of articulating and justi-
fying government, as well as representing social rea lity as a  governable 
object. While such rationalities and more specific programmes of govern-
ment work to ‘render reality into the domain of thought’, the translation 
of the latter into the domain of reality depends on various technologies 
of government – that is, ‘actual mechanisms through which authorities 
[seek] to shape, norma lise and instrumenta lise the conduct, thought, 
decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the objectives they 
consider desirable’.15
In his lectures of early-1979, Foucault identified and subjected 
two forms of neoliberalism to detailed analysis.16 First, the so-called 
 Ordoliberalen in post-1945 West Germany, who treated the market and 
competition in non-naturalistic terms, and proposed both a diffusion of 
‘the enterprise-form throughout the social fabric as its generalised prin-
ciple of functioning’ and extensive legal activism aimed at creating both 
a market economy and entrepreneurial forms within the wider society.17 
Second, the so-called Chicago School of Economics, which conceived of 
all human behaviour in economic-rational terms, and envisaged a ‘purely 
economic method of programming the totality of governmental action’.18 
In contrast to how Ordoliberalen like Walter Eucken and  Wilhelm Röpke 
pursued ‘the idea of governing society in the name of the economy’, 
 Chicago economists like Gary Becker sought to ‘re-define the social 
sphere as a form of the economic domain’.19
Although these different forms of neoliberalism share certain features 
with an earlier liberal rationality of government – including the voca-
bulary of ‘market’, ‘competition’, ‘efficiency’, ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’, as 
well as the constitution of ‘the market’ as the ideal in relation to which 
governance should be oriented – there are some significant differences 
14. Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Michel Foucault: Beyond 
 Structuralism and Hermeneutics, eds Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1982), 220.
15. Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, ‘Governing Economic Life’, Economy and 
 Society 19, no. 1 (1990): 8.
16. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. For a good exposition in English, see 
Thomas Lemke, ‘ “The Birth of Biopolitics”: Michel Foucault’s Lectures at the 
 Collège de France on Neo-liberal Governmentality’, Economy and Society 30,
no. 2 (2001): 190–207.
17. Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’, in The  Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter 
Miller (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 42.
18. Ibid., 43.
19. Lemke, ‘ “The Birth of Biopolitics” ’, 197.
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between them. While classical liberals considered the market as part of 
the natural order of things, neoliberals share the view that ‘the market 
exists, and can only exist, under certain political, legal and institutional 
conditions that must be actively constructed by government’.20 Further-
more, and although both forms of liberalism tie the rationality of govern-
ment to the rational conduct of individuals, neoliberals conceive of such 
conduct not as part of human nature, but rather as ‘artificially arranged 
or contrived forms of the free, entrepreneurial and competitive conduct 
of  economic-rational individuals’.21 Lastly, neoliberals go further than 
classical liberals in defining positive tasks for governmental activism 
– including, not least, the task of ‘constructing the … conditions that will 
enable an artificial competitive game of entrepreneurial conduct to be 
played to best effect’.22
Neoliberal Governance of States
While much governmentality research has focused on how neoliberalism 
has come to inform multiple practices on the part of state authorities, the 
argument here is that states are themselves increasingly subjected to a 
form of neoliberal governance in the contemporary world political eco-
nomy – in the sense that they are constituted and acted upon as subjects 
with a rationality derived from arranged forms of entrepreneurial and 
competitive behaviour. Below, I will briefly discuss two elements cen-
tral to this constitution of states as neoliberal market subjects. First, the 
emergence and contemporary prominence of the discourse on national 
competitiveness in reflections on state governance. Second, the program-
matic thoughts on neoliberal governance of states found in influential 
strands of public choice theory.23
While the discourse on national competitiveness was highly contested 
little more than a decade ago, the prominence, taken-for-grantedness 
and meta-character of the ‘competitiveness problem’ in contempo-
rary reflections on state governance cannot be exaggerated. In a scho-
larly context, the interchangeable concepts of ‘competitiveness’ and 
 ‘competitive advantage’ have for some time been central to the field 
of Business Administration in general, and its subfield of strategic 
20. Graham Burchell, ‘Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self’, 
in  Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of 
 Government, ed. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (London: 
UCL Press, 1996), 23.
21. Ibid., 23–4.
22. Ibid., 27.
23. To some extent, the next few paragraphs draw on Tore Fougner, ‘The State, 
International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalisation: Is There a Future 
Beyond “the Competition State”?’, Review of International Studies 32, no. 1 (2006): 
165–85.
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 analysis in  particular.24 In this context, the governmental problem of 
 competitiveness has concerned how to improve ‘the capacity of a firm to 
compete, grow, and be profitable in the marketplace’.25 In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, however, the problem of competitiveness moved from 
being internal to reflections on how to manage a firm, to become internal 
to reflections on how to govern the state – that is, a problem of national 
competitiveness.26 This shift in the use of the competitiveness concept 
notwithstanding, firms remained the primary referent of the competi-
tion in question, and the constitution of national competitiveness as a 
governmental problem for state authorities primarily worked to direct 
their policies towards the perceived needs and well-being of national 
firms engaged in competition with foreign firms.
More recently, the discourse on ‘economic globalisation’ contributed to 
transform the meaning of national competitiveness and, in consequence, 
the terms of the so-called national competitiveness problem. The reason 
for this is that a globalist conception of the world economy as characte-
rised by a high degree of mobility on the part of firms and production 
factors made it problematic to talk about ‘national’ firms competing with 
‘foreign’ ones for shares of international product and service markets. 
While some have argued that the globalisation of capital has made the 
notion of national competitiveness completely meaningless,27 others have 
more commonly re-employed the notion with reference to the territorial 
state and its capacity to compete with other states for shares of global 
economic activity and ‘footloose’ capital.28 As the primary subjects of the 
competition in relation to which the concept of national competitiveness 
is used have changed from firms to states, the primary governmental 
problem on the part of state authorities has shifted towards that of mak-
ing the state itself more competitive.29
24. Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries 
and Competitors (New York: Free Press, 1980), and Competitive Advantage: Creating 
and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York: Free Press, 1985).
25. Eric S. Reinert, ‘Competitiveness and its Predecessors – a 500-year Cross-
national Perspective’, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 6, no. 1 (1995): 25.
26. Key publications contributing to this change include Office of Economic 
Research, Report of the President on U.S. Competitiveness (Washington, DC: US 
Department of Labor, 1980); President’s Commission on Industrial Competitive-
ness, Global Competition: The New Reality (Washington, DC: US Government Print-
ing Office, 1985).
27. Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford: Blackwell Publi-
shers, 2001), 142.
28. Robert B. Reich, ‘Who Is US?’, Harvard Business Review 68, no. 1 (1990): 53–64; 
Susan Strange, ‘Who Are EU? Ambiguities in the Concept of Competitiveness’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 36, no. 1 (1998): 101–14.
29. Note that there is a parallel here to how also other territorial entities
(e.g. cities and regions) have been constituted as competitors through the compe-
titiveness discourse.
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From the point of view of public choice theory, this conception of 
states as competitors and entrepreneurs in a global market for capital, 
technology and high-skilled labour approximates a normative ideal.30 The 
reason for this is that what is variously referred to as ‘locational competi-
tion’, ‘intergovernmental competition’, ‘interjurisdictional competition’, 
‘regulatory competition’ and ‘institutional competition’ is considered 
to be ‘a useful mechanism to control the efficiency of government …
a discovery device for better policy approaches in the sense of Hayek … 
an instrument to tame the Hobbesian Leviathan’ and, by implication, a 
means by which to protect individual liberty and democracy.31 Based on 
the common assumptions that ‘countries can benefit economically from 
luring factors into their jurisdiction’, and that ‘[i]ndividuals may “vote 
by their feet” and move either themselves or capital to the most preferred 
jurisdiction’, it is argued that state authorities ‘will, driven by their self 
interest, compete in offering favorable rules and institutions … to mobile 
factors’.32 It follows from this that the neoliberal ideal of governing states 
through locational competition is pegged to a conception of the state as a 
form of the homo economicus.
Even if current conditions approximate their ideal, public choice scho-
lars are faced with an important challenge: with competitive behaviour 
considered as unnatural for states as it is for firms, ‘[c]ompetition among 
governments, like competition among firms, cannot be left to itself’.33 
Against this background, public choice theorists often postulate three 
 conditions for locational competition to be played to best effect. First, 
given the emphasis placed on ‘exit’ as the mechanism that ‘changes the 
[cost–benefit] calculus of governments’,34 production factors and pro-
ducts/ services must be able to enter and leave locations freely. Second, 
in order for firms and individuals to act on (re)locational opportunities, 
relevant and comparable information about different  locations must be 
30. ‘Public choice theory’ is used here with reference not merely to the Virginia 
School of Economics, but to ‘economic theories of politics’ more generally. As a 
sub-form of Chicago neoliberalism, public choice theory can be conceived as an 
attempt to re-describe and govern the political as a form of the economic.
31. Horst Siebert, ‘Locational Competition: A Neglected Paradigm in the Inter-
national Division of Labour’, World Economy 29, no. 2 (2006): 152.
32. Peter Lewisch, ‘Constitutional Economics and Choice of Law’, in James
M. Buchanan Festschrift (1999) http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/fest/files/lewisch.
htm. While Lewisch implies that state authorities act in the interest of the country 
or the citizens that they represent, other public choice theorists would emphasise 
self-interest on the part of politicians. For a survey of economic theories of inter-
state competition, see Daphne A. Keynon, ‘Theories of Interjurisdictional Compe-
tition’, New England Economic Review, March–April (1997): 13–28.
33. Roland Vaubel, ‘Enforcing Competition among Governments: Theory and 
Application to the European Union’, Constitutional Political Economy 10, no. 4 
(1999): 327.
34. Siebert, ‘Locational Competition’, 141.
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 readily available. Third, governments must not establish  regulatory 
 cartels among  themselves, impose negative non-market externali-
ties on each other or behave strategically to the detriment of others.35 
With regard to how these conditions can be met, there is no agreement 
among public choice theorists. On the one hand, there are those who 
argue that locational competition is ‘part and parcel of the international 
sponta neous market order’ – that is, a ‘bottom-up’ international order 
consi dered to emerge as a result of liberal policies being implemented 
at the state level – and, thus, ‘a substitute for world government and, in 
many (but not all) instances, an alternative to negotiated cooperation at 
the international level’.36 On the other hand, there are those who argue 
that there is a need for rules of locational competition to be established, 
monitored and enforced at the supranational level. As of today, the lat-
ter position is the one most commonly taken within the relevant body of 
public choice literature.37
Considering the contemporary world political economy, ‘exit’ is cer-
tainly an option for many firms and factors of production – due partly to 
unilateral government policies (e.g. removal of controls on flows of capi-
tal and high-skilled labour), and partly to intergovernmental agreements 
(e.g. trade liberalisation and intellectual property protection). Moreover, 
it is equally clear that there is plenty of information around as it concerns 
all possible aspects of different locations. What is missing, however, is a 
set of supranational rules that prevent states from establishing regula-
tory cartels, imposing negative non-market externalities on each other, 
and behaving strategically at each other’s expense – the major exception 
being the authority given to the WTO as it concerns trade. While the lack 
of such rules and a supranational competition authority can make loca-
tional competition less efficient and stable than many public choice theo-
rists would prefer, it does not imply that governments cannot and will 
not be induced to behave competitively. On the contrary, several actors 
35. More generally, public choice theorists would emphasise also the  conditions 
of ‘a fragmented structure consisting of a large number of authorities’, ‘a high 
level of local autonomy’ and ‘a high reliance on local revenues’. George A. Boyne, 
‘Competition and Local Government: A Public Choice Perspective’, Urban Studies 
33, nos 3–5 (1996): 703.
36. Razeen Sally, ‘Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order:
An Advance Sketch’, Constitutional Political Economy 9, no. 1 (1998): 38–9.
37. Albert Breton, Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and 
Public Finance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 264ff.; Wolfgang 
Kerber and Viktor Vanberg, ‘Competition among Institutions: Evolution within 
Constraints’, in Competition among Institutions, ed. Lüder Gerken (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1995), 35–64; Siebert, ‘Locational Competition’, 152–5; Stefan Sinn, 
‘The Taming of the Leviathan: Competition among Governments’, Constitutional 
Political Economy 3, no. 2 (1992): 177–98; Roger van den Bergh, ‘Towards an Insti-
tutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe’, Kyklos 53, no. 4 
(2000): 435–66; Vaubel, ‘Enforcing Competition among Governments’.
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work to constitute and act on states as flexible and manipulable market 
subjects on a continuous basis, and producers of knowledge on world 
competitiveness play a central role among these.38
Before considering the latter in detail, some brief comments can be 
made concerning how the neoliberal governance of states stands in rela-
tion to the conception of states as security competitors within an anar-
chical system that surrounded the seventeenth-century emergence of 
governmentality in its more specific sense. In this connection, while lib-
eralism also developed within the conditions set by such a competitive 
state system, its governmental ambitions extended beyond the state level 
to include the use of ‘market interactions and other devices to civilise and 
to regulate the conduct … of states’.39 Such an attempt to pacify  states 
informed not only the promotion of free trade in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, but also the liberalisation of inter-state economic relations after 
1945. In this latter context, while pre-globalisation concerns with national 
competitiveness can be located within a quest for relative state power 
– with the competitiveness of national corporations seen as feeding posi-
tively into the strength and security of the state – such post-globalisation 
concerns are more properly located within a broader liberal attempt to 
pacify governments in and through the deeper marketisation of the state 
that locational competition implies.
Competitiveness Reports
Although there are many competitiveness reports around, the two most 
influential ones are undoubtedly The Global Competitiveness Report and 
The World Competitiveness Yearbook, published respectively by the WEF 
and the IMD. While competing for attention and fame today, it is impor-
tant to note that the two reports emerged from within the same enter-
prise. The original concept for measuring national competitiveness was 
developed by WEF founder and president Klaus Schwab in the late 1970s, 
and the first competitiveness report was published in 1979 with the title 
Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry by the WEF’s forerun-
ner, the European Management Forum (EMF). In the late 1980s, the WEF 
began cooperating with the IMD, and they jointly produced The World 
 Competitiveness Report (WCR) from 1989 to 1995. The two  institutions 
38. Other actors include business scholars like Michael Porter and Richard 
 Florida targeting their ‘how-to-compete’ knowledge at states-as-competitors; 
consultancy firms promoting their services vis-a-vis state authorities with 
refe rence to their need to compete for mobile firms and production factors; 
 individual firms pitting countries against each other in ‘locational tourna-
ments’; and intergovernmental organisations of different kinds framing their 
policy guidelines in terms of the need of states to attract mobile firms and pro-
duction factors.
39. Hindess, ‘Neo-liberal Citizenship’, 136.
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parted ways in 1996, when the IMD and the WEF began producing The 
World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) and The Global Competitiveness 
Report (GCR) respectively.
The GCR is produced by the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Network, 
and evaluates the potential for countries to raise productivity and achieve 
economic growth. From 2000 to 2005, it did this through the construction 
of two competitiveness rankings. First, a Growth Competitiveness Index 
developed by Jeffrey D. Sachs and John McArthur of Harvard University 
and, second, a Business Competitiveness Index developed by Michael
E. Porter of Harvard Business School.40 Assisted by Xavier Sala-i-Martin 
of Columbia University, the WEF has recently introduced a new Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) as its main indicator. Being a revised ver-
sion of the Sachs–McArthur framework, the GCI assesses ‘the set of fac-
tors, policies and institutions that determine the level of productivity of 
a country’, and is composed of nine pillars: institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomy, health and primary education, higher education and 
training, market efficiency, technological readiness, business sophistica-
tion, and innovation.41 As was the case with the previous indices, each 
pillar consists of several variables, and sub-indices prepared for each 
 pillar are combined in the construction of the overall country ranking.
The WCY is produced by the IMD’s World Competitiveness Cen-
ter, and is claimed to analyse and rank ‘the ability of nations to create 
and maintain an environment which sustains the competitiveness of 
enterprises’.42 Since 1996, it has done this through the construction of 
an index called the World Competitiveness Scoreboard (WCS). When 
preparing this index, ‘the national environment’ is divided into four 
main factors, each of which is further divided into five sub- factors: 
economic performance (domestic economy, international trade, 
international investment, employment and prices), government effi-
ciency (public finance, fiscal policy, institutional framework, business 
 legislation and societal framework), business efficiency (producti-
vity, labour market, finance,  management practices and attitudes 
40. See respectively Augusto Lopez-Claros et al., ‘Policies and Institutions 
Underpinning Economic Growth: Results from the Competitiveness Indexes’ 
and Michael E. Porter, ‘Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: 
Findings from the Business Competitiveness Index’, in The Global Competitive-
ness Report 2005–2006, ed. Augusto Lopez-Claros et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
 Macmillan, 2005), 3–42 and 43–77. The latter index was informed by Michael
E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (London: Macmillan, 1990).
41. Augusto Lopez-Claros et al., ‘The Global Competitiveness Index: Identify-
ing the Key Elements of Sustainable Growth’, in The Global Competitiveness Report 
2006–2007, ed. Augusto Lopez-Claros et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), 3–50.
42. Suzanne Rosselet-McCauley, ‘Methodology and Principles of Analysis’, in 
The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2006 (Lausanne: IMD, 2006), 19.
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and values), and infrastructure (basic infrastructure, technological 
 infrastructure, scientific infrastructure, health and environment, and 
education). Each sub-factor counts for 5 per cent of the overall score, 
and a country’s competitiveness is  determined by adding them up.
When constructing their indices, both the WEF and the IMD make use 
of a combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ data. While the former consists of 
publicly available data from sources such as the IMF, the World Bank and 
the UN, the latter is made up of data collected through ‘executive opinion 
surveys’ – that is, annual surveys conducted among business executives. 
These surveys, which used to be called ‘business confidence surveys’ in 
the pre-1996 WCRs, are meant to capture the perceptions of business and 
investment decision-makers, and the respondent numbers are currently 
about 11,000 and 4,000 for the GCR and the WCY respectively. Overall, 
survey data provide two-thirds of the variables included in the GCI, and 
make up one-third of the overall weight of the WCS.
In spite of the importance commonly ascribed to the GCR and the WCY 
by their producers, journalists, politicians and academics, these reports 
have not been without their critics. While most of these seem to agree 
on the value of the kind of exercise that the reports represent, they tend 
to consider the GCR and the WCY not to be up to the task due to their 
flawed theoretical frameworks and/or methodologies.43 In the context of 
the present article, however, the theoretical or methodological quality of 
the reports and their indices is secondary to the governmental work that 
they do. Considered in terms of the governmentality problematic, the 
GCR and the WCY contribute to constitute states as flexible and manipu-
lable subjects by enframing them in a competitive market game, and act 
on their actions as such subjects from a distance.
Constituting States as Competitive Market Subjects
The GCR and the WCY are annual practices on the part of the WEF 
and the IMD that are enabled by and reproduce the primary dis-
course in and through which states are constituted as market actors in 
43. Harry P. Bowen and Wim Moesen, ‘Benchmarking the Competitiveness 
of Nations: Non-uniform Weighting and Non-economic Dimensions’, Vlerick 
Leuven Gent Working Papers 2; Orsetta Causa and Daniel Cohen, ‘Overcoming 
Barriers to Competitiveness’, OECD Development Centre, Working Paper 239; 
Stéphane  Grégoir and Françoise Maurel, ‘Les indices de compétitivité des pays: 
interprétation et limites’, in Compétitivité, eds. Michèle Debonneuil and Lionel 
Fontagné (Paris: La Documentation française, 2003), 97–132; David E. Kaplan, 
‘Measuring our Competitiveness – Critical Examination of the IMD and WEF 
Competitiveness Indicators for South Africa’, Development Southern Africa 20,
no. 1 (2003): 75–88; Sanjaya Lall, ‘Competitiveness Indices and Developing Countries:
An Economic Evaluation of the Global Competitiveness Report’, World Develop-
ment 29, no. 9 (2001): 1501–25.
Fougner: Neoliberal Governance of States 
 315
the  contemporary world political economy – namely, the discourse on 
national  competitiveness. In this connection, it should be mentioned that 
the WEF’s forerunner was central in bringing talk about competitiveness 
to bear on states in the first place. While the EMF first convened in 1971 
to ‘discuss a coherent strategy for European business to face challenges 
in the international marketplace’,44 its first competitiveness report of 
1979 signalled a shift in focus away from a concern with competitiveness 
resulting from the internal efficiency of firms towards a concern with the 
effects of national business environments on corporate competitiveness.
As a key site for the articulation of the economistic and market-related 
discourse that completely dominated globalisation talk until the mid-
1990s,45 the WEF also played a central role in redefining the terms of 
the so-called national competitiveness problem. Conceiving of firms as 
being increasingly ‘homeless’, and the nationality of investors as being 
increasingly irrelevant for national economies,46 so-called attractive-
ness rankings were included in the WCR of 1991. With ‘country com-
petitiveness’ defined as the ‘extent to which a national environment is 
conducive or detrimental to the domestic and global competitiveness of 
enterprises operating in [that country]’, the report proceeded by evaluat-
ing such environments in a ‘double perspective’. First, they were judged 
in terms of their attractiveness for business investment, with ‘attractive-
ness’ understood with reference to ‘the quality of resources available in 
a country from the point of view of an entrepreneur’.47 Second, national 
environments were judged in terms of their ‘aggressiveness’ understood 
with reference to ‘the competence of firms in transforming the available 
resources into value-added products and services’.48
An explicit concern with attractiveness was maintained by the IMD 
as a key dimension considered to shape countries’ competitiveness 
environments in its post-1995 WCY publication. In the 2000  edition, 
for instance, Stéphane Garelli argued that as ‘[e]nterprises now  benefit 
from an enormous choice in selecting their business locations … nations 
need to compete to attract or retain enterprises’.49 Although the WEF’s
44. WEF, ‘About Us’ (http://www.weforum.org).
45. Geoffrey Allen Pigman, ‘A Multifunctional Case Study for Teaching Inter-
national Political Economy: The World Economic Forum as Shar-pei or Wolf in 
Sheep’s Clothing’, International Studies Perspectives 3, no. 3 (2002): 300–3.
46. Thomas M. Rauschenbach, ‘Key Ingredients of Competitiveness in Perspec-
tive’, in The World Competitiveness Report 1991 (Lausanne and Geneva: IMD and 
WEF, 1991), 201–7.
47. Liisa Välikangas, ‘The 1991 World Competitiveness Report, eleventh edi-
tion’, in The World Competitiveness Report 1991 (Lausanne and Geneva: IMD and 
WEF, 1991), 8.
48. Ibid.
49. Stéphane Garelli, ‘Competitiveness of Nations: The Fundamentals’, in The 
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000 (Lausanne: IMD, 2000), 48.
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post-1995 GCRs have been less explicitly concerned with  ‘attractiveness’, 
they have nonetheless incorporated its locational- competitive logic. In 
the first GCR, for instance, Claude Smadja argued that ‘in today’s global 
economy there is mega-competition, not only for market share but also 
for capital and investment and for efficient production bases’.50 In the 
next GCR, two articles explicitly addressed the issue of FDI and country 
attractiveness, and one of them concluded that ‘countries that are more 
competitive … are also looked upon by investors as better prospects for 
direct investment’.51 More recently, Schwab has stated that in today’s 
‘global economy characterised by the nearly instant flow of information 
and  capital … businesses are formulating their strategies and decision 
making with an increasingly global perspective’, and ‘countries are hav-
ing to be increasingly creative in order to maintain a competitive edge’.52 
With the creativity in question referring to the creation of ‘an environ-
ment which is more supportive of private sector economic activity’,53 
countries are constituted as entities engaged in locational competition.
Acting on States as Competitive Market Subjects
Beyond their contribution to the general constitution of states as com-
petitive entities, the GCR and the WCY should also be understood as 
more specific governmental acts on the part of the WEF and the IMD 
– namely, as actions aimed at shaping state conduct. In this connection, 
it can initially be noted that both reports explicitly seek to influence 
 government policies around the world. In more specific terms, the WEF 
and the IMD present themselves as providers of inputs into benchmark-
ing practices on the part of governments. In the case of the WEF, the 
GCR is promoted with reference to it providing a ‘unique benchmarking 
tool … for  governments in identifying obstacles to economic growth and 
assisting in the design of better economic policies’.54 In a similar fashion, 
the WCY is promoted with reference to how ‘[g]overnment agencies find 
important indicators to benchmark their policies against those of other 
countries and to evaluate performance over time’.55
While I will return to the issue of benchmarking shortly, a couple 
of comments related to this concern with government policies are 
 pertinent. First, although the WEF and the IMD seemingly take it for 
50. Claude Smadja, ‘Beyond the Statistics’, in The Global Competitiveness Report 
1996 (Geneva: WEF, 1996), 28.
51. Howard Shatz, ‘What Attracts FDI?’, in The Global Competitiveness Report 
1997 (Geneva: WEF, 1997), 40.
52. Klaus Schwab, ‘Preface’, in The Global Competitiveness Report 2004–2005, eds 
Michael E. Porter et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), ix.
53. Ibid., x.
54. Publisher’s webpage (http://www.palgrave.com/worldeconomicforum).
55. Rosselet-McCauley, ‘Methodology and Principles of Analysis’, 19.
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granted that  governments are engaged in efforts to improve national 
 competitiveness, the GCR and the WCY are themselves centrally involved 
in both  constituting competitiveness as a key governmental problem, and 
 ascribing primary responsibility for its resolution to governments. In a 
globalising world economy, responsible governments concerned with 
the welfare of their citizens are told that they cannot but attend to the 
competitiveness problem in a serious fashion. Second, although the GCR 
and the WCY are presented as serving the governmental end of improv-
ing national competitiveness and welfare, these reports should more 
importantly be considered in relation to another end – namely, that of 
improving the welfare of transnational capital. In spite of this not being 
made explicit in the reports, it should not be forgotten that WEF members 
‘represent the world’s 1,000 leading companies’, and the ‘IMD’s mission 
is to serve the international corporate community’.56
With benchmarking understood as a practice in and through which the 
improvement of an entity’s performance is sought through compa rison 
with an internal or external reference point or, more simply, as the imple-
mentation of ‘best practice’,57 the GCR and the WCY facilitate this by iden-
tifying factors deemed critical for national competitiveness, by measuring 
how countries perform with respect to the factors in question, and by iden-
tifying both improvement opportunities (i.e. factors on which a country’s 
performance is relatively poor) and potential sources of learning (i.e. coun-
tries performing well on the same factors). With these benchmarking tasks 
undertaken by the WEF and the IMD, it is left for governments to complete 
the process by studying the countries that are ‘best in class’, and imple-
menting learning-based changes aimed at improving performance. In the 
case of the WEF, governments are provided further guidance towards that 
end through the activities of its national Partner Institutes (some of which 
were catalysed into existence by the WEF), as well as WEF-sponsored 
regional and national workshops and competitiveness meetings arranged 
in the wake of the GCR’s publication.
In order to make better sense of the governmental role internal to the 
WEF’s and the IMD’s promotion of and contribution to the installation 
and operation of benchmarking on the part of state actors, it can be useful 
to consider in some detail what benchmarking is all about, and what its 
application to states implies. In this connection, Wendy Larner and  Richard 
Le Heron have identified three ‘generations’ of  benchmarking techniques.58 
56. WEF, ‘About Us’ (http://www.weforum.org); IMD, ‘Key Facts’ (http://
www02.imd.ch/pressroom/facts/index.cfm).
57. On benchmarking conventionally understood, see Tony Bendell, Louise 
Boutler and Paul Goodstadt, Benchmarking for Competitive Advantage, 2nd edn 
(London: Pitman Publishing, 1998).
58. Wendy Larner and Richard Le Heron, ‘Global Benchmarking: Participating 
“at a Distance” in the Globalizing Economy’, in Global Governmentality, eds Larner 
and Walters, 212–32.
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When it first emerged as a ‘technical tool’ within a  manufacturing context 
in the 1950s, benchmarking was narrowly focused on efforts to improve 
quality through comparison with internally set standards. In the late 
1980s, however, the relevance of benchmarking was widened, and it came 
increasingly to constitute an integral part of ‘ managerial strategy’ broadly 
conceived. As part and parcel of this shift, benchmarking became explicitly 
linked to corporate concerns about competitive advantage, and compari-
sons were increasingly made with standards or ‘best practice’ identified 
within or across industries. More recently, benchmarking understood as a 
‘calculative practice’ related to quantitative measures of performance has 
become integral to contemporary forms of neoliberal rule within private 
and public organisations alike.
Against this background, benchmarking can today be regarded as 
a general ‘technology of performance’59 in and through which vari-
ous subjects and spaces are constituted and acted upon as governable 
objects of a neoliberal kind. In more specific terms, Peter  Triantafillou 
has conceived of benchmarking as a normalising governmental techno-
logy. With ‘normalisation’ understood in terms of ‘the procedures and 
processes through which a norm is brought into play and informs the 
practices that it seeks to regulate’,60 benchmarking works through nor-
malisation in the sense that it encourages or stimulates self- governance 
through the production of normalising knowledge of that which is 
sought to be  governed. Through a set of norms and standards estab-
lished and visua lised through processes of comparison, benchmark-
ing induces its objects to relate to how one should act in order to 
achieve best practice.61 In other words, the normalising comparison 
that informs benchmarking constitutes the objects of comparison as 
 subjects that begin to act in ways that conform to the established norms 
or  standards.
As a neoliberal technology of government, benchmarking can be prac-
tised in two ways. First, there is a ‘bottom-up approach, where individual 
organisations develop their own benchmarking projects and try to find 
relevant benchmarking partners’ to learn from or exchange experiences 
with.62 In this case, benchmarking is used by a subject to act on its own 
actions – that is, as a technology of self-government. Second, there is a 
‘top-down approach, where benchmarking is imposed externally’ with 
59. Dean, Governmentality, 168.
60. Peter Triantafillou, ‘Addressing Network Governance through the Con-
cepts of Governmentality and Normalization’, Administrative Theory and Practice 
26, no. 4 (2004): 496.
61. Peter Triantafillou, ‘Benchmarking som normaliserende styringsteknologi’, 
Politica: Tidsskrift for politisk videnskab 38, no. 1 (2006): 22–39.
62. Sigurdur Helgason, ‘International Benchmarking: Experiences from OECD 
Countries’, Paper presented at conference on International Benchmarking, 
 Copenhagen, 20–21 February 1997, 3.
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the aim of making others act in particular ways.63 As noted by Helgason in 
connection with benchmarking within the public sector,  ‘benchmarking 
can be used instead of more direct control, by introducing competitive 
pressures on public institutions’.64 In order to avoid a too-rigid distinc-
tion between these two approaches to benchmarking, it should be noted 
that it is perfectly possible for bottom-up benchmarking to be a product 
of external stimuli, and for competitive pressure to be introduced by non-
central agencies – be they external to or at a lower level within a hierar-
chical organisation.65
Being constitutive of the very reality that it claims to measure, country 
benchmarking does not operate on the basis of a set of essential state 
characteristics, but rather works to constitute states as entities with 
benchmarking characteristics. First, given its provision of ‘an external 
frame of reference explicitly linked to concerns about competitiveness’,66 
benchmarking constitutes states as competitive entities driven not by 
internal socio-political processes, but rather by external or global stan-
dards of conduct.67 Second, given the importance ascribed to quantitative 
measures and comparisons of performance, benchmarking constitutes 
states as calculative agencies, or entities with a capacity to calculate and 
rank alternative courses of action. Third, given the overriding concern 
with implementing ‘best practice’, benchmarking constitutes states as 
technocratic agencies acting in accordance with expert determination of 
what works best.68 Fourth, given the centrality of change and continu-
ous improvement – as a consequence of how standards or ‘best prac-
tices’ undergo continuous change – benchmarking constitutes states as 
transformative agencies, or entities engaged in a never-ending process of 
reinventing themselves.
With their competitiveness reports, the WEF and the IMD do 
not so much respond to the needs of pre-constituted competition 
states, as actively contribute to produce such states by imposing 
 competitive  pressure on them. This pressure follows from the reports’ 
 overall  competitive framing of states, the normalising and visualised 
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Regarding the latter, see discussion on ‘Salmon’s External Benchmark 
 Mechanism’ in Breton, Competitive Governments, 189–94.
66. Larner and Le Heron, ‘Global Benchmarking’, 217.
67. In connection with ‘bottom-up’ benchmarking, note that subjects are consti-
tuted also as cooperative entities. Julie R. Wolfram Cox, Leon Mann and Danny 
Samson, ‘Benchmarking as a Mixed Metaphor: Disentangling Assumptions of 
Competition and Collaboration’, Journal of Management Studies 34, no. 2 (1997): 
285–314.
68. Anu Kantola, ‘Transforming Political Imaginaries: The Uses of Competiti-
veness’, Department of Communication, University of Helsinki, Working Paper 
3 (2006).
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 comparison among countries found in the reports, and the  competitive 
logic internal to the  benchmarking that the WEF and the IMD
promote and seek to install in states. An additional dimension relates to 
the second most  important intended use of the competitiveness reports 
– namely, as guides to corporate investment decisions. If such decisions 
are influenced by the GCR- and/or WCY-rankings, then the economic 
prospects for countries with relatively poor rankings are threatened. 
However, given both that all countries have relatively poor rankings on 
some factors, and that ‘best practice’ is subject to continuous change, 
the economic prospects for all countries are rendered highly uncertain. 
In consequence, irrespective of firms acting or not on the basis of com-
petitiveness rankings, the potential of them doing so leaves no room 
for complacency even for high-ranked countries, and performance-
 enhancing action is constituted as a necessity for competitive success on 
the part of all states.
With regard to state conduct, benchmarking based on the GCR and/or 
the WCY induces states to act in accordance with norms and standards 
that first and foremost imply the provision of favourable conditions for 
mobile firms and capital. Informed by a concern to make territorial states 
knowledgeable, comparable and governable as ‘business environments’ 
within the context of a globalised world economy, variables are included 
in the indices primarily on the basis of their perceived relevance for cor-
porate activity, and the norms and standards established and visua lised 
through comparison concern how various policies, institutions and other 
conditions influence it. Beyond full economic openness vis-à-vis the 
external world, these norms and standards add up to a model in which 
the market is constituted as the ideal in relation to which national policy-
making should be directed, and governments should limit themselves to 
constituting the market, promoting entrepreneurship, policing competi-
tion and providing so-called public goods in cases of ‘market failure’.
While this model is but a prescription for neoliberal governance within 
states, it should be stressed that it follows not from competitiveness index-
ing and country benchmarking as such, but rather from the particular 
norms and standards established and valorised in the GCR and the WCY. 
For instance, it is fully conceivable that a competitiveness index informed 
by a different conception of the causes of competitiveness could play into 
non-neoliberal governance within states. Furthermore, it is equally con-
ceivable that country benchmarking oriented towards ends other than 
competitiveness would establish and valorise governmental norms and 
standards of a non-neoliberal kind. Against this background, it should be 
clear that the neoliberal norms and standards established by the GCR and 
the WCY are products primarily of the theoretical frameworks informing 
them. Secondarily, given the role played by  executive opinion  surveys 
in assessing country performance, they should be  conceived also as 
 corporate products.
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Although country benchmarking can be conceived of as externally 
imposed by the WEF and the IMD – owing to countries having no say 
in their inclusion in the reports – it should be emphasised that they do 
not coerce states to benchmark or seek to improve their performance 
 according to the norms and standards in question. Rather, they operate 
largely at a distance, from where they seek to harness the capacity of 
states to govern themselves in a rational and calculated fashion. Even 
if there is a strong degree of dependence in the sense that governments 
end up engaging in corporate calculation as part and parcel of their own 
calculation, the governance of states in question remains wedded to the 
ideas of free will and rational pursuit of self-interest on the part of states. 
In a world with limited restrictions on the mobility of firms and capital, a 
country geared towards the sacred goal of national competitiveness can 
largely be counted on to compare and seek to improve its relative per-
formance on criteria considered to matter the most to mobile firms and 
capital.69
As a final point, it should be noted that the inducement for states to 
benchmark according to the GCR and/or the WCY is influenced also 
by the reports’ status as academic-scientific knowledge regarding the 
economic conditions of countries worldwide. When initially produced 
in-house by the WEF, the competitiveness reports were little more than 
business perspectives on political framework conditions in Europe. To a 
large extent, this changed when the WEF linked up with the IMD in the 
late 1980s. While the post-1995 WCY continues to receive its academic-
scientific authority from the IMD, such authority on the part of the GCR 
has been sought through the WEF’s collaboration with ‘experts’ like 
Sachs and McArthur of Harvard University, Porter of Harvard  Business 
School and, more recently, Sala-i-Martin of Columbia University. If 
prominent academic institutions and scholars lend their authority to the 
competitiveness reports, and if the reports’ norms and standards for state 
conduct are sanctioned by influential economic theories, then so much 
greater is the inducement for ‘responsible’ states to take them seriously 
and act accordingly.
Conclusion: The Future of Neoliberal Governance of States
This article has argued that the competitiveness reports produced by 
the WEF and the IMD are not innocent sources of knowledge regard-
ing the economic state of affairs in various countries, but rather play a 
central role in contemporary efforts to govern states in accordance with a 
neoliberal governmentality. In more specific terms, they do this by both 
69. This accords fully with the customer perspective internal to benchmarking. 
C. J. McNair and Kathleen H. J. Leibfried, Benchmarking: A Tool for Continuous 
Improvement (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1992), 2ff.
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 contributing to the constitution of states as flexible and  manipulable 
market subjects, and acting on their actions as such subjects from a dis-
tance. Constituted as rational and self-interested subjects engaged in 
competition for economic activity, states are induced to improve their 
 performance by acting in accordance with the norms and standards that 
the reports establish and visualise through inter-state comparison. With 
best practice across multiple variables conforming to a neoliberal model 
of governance within states, governments are guided towards the provi-
sion of favourable conditions for mobile firms and capital.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to consider the exact 
extent to which, and way in which, the GCR and the WCY are put to 
use in  various countries, it is clear that many governments do engage 
more or less systematically in benchmarking exercises of the intended 
kind, and that many of these exercises are wholly or partly based on the 
reports produced by the WEF and the IMD.70 Furthermore, ‘national 
competitiveness’ has also become lucrative business for the big consul-
tancy firms, and some governments engage them to help with bench-
marking and policy development based thereon. A case in point that 
draws almost exclusively on the GCR and the WCY is J. E. Austin Associ-
ates, Inc. (JAA), which has also been frequently contracted to implement 
USAID-funded ‘national competitiveness initiatives’ based on the com-
petitiveness reports in question.71 It is also noteworthy that international 
organisations like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) use the 
system of GCR-indicators to measure the progress of their ‘national com-
petitiveness programmes’.72
Even if benchmarking based on the GCR and/or the WCY feeds into 
neoliberal governance within states, actual cases of such governance can-
not be reduced to an effect of GCR- and/or WCY-based benchmarking 
alone. While some governments have moved in a neoliberal  direction 
independently of what other governments do, yet others have been 
70. Countries that engaged early in such benchmarking exercises include 
 several smaller ones in Europe (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the 
 Netherlands) and East Asia (e.g. Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore). In 2002, 
the WEF also prided itself for its collaboration with Colombia, ‘whose economic 
reform programme is based on the [WEF’s] competitiveness approach’. WEF, 
Annual Report 2001/2002 (Geneva: WEF, 2002), 11. While the GCR and the WCY 
have played a central role in these and other efforts to benchmark country com-
petitiveness, the exact way in which they have been put to use and contributed 
to give shape to policies requires a separate analysis of each particular case.
71. With initial assistance from Michael Porter’s Monitor Company – itself 
involved in providing competitiveness consultancy services to governments 
around the world – JAA developed a Country Competitiveness Analysis metho-
dology in 1997–8, and has since implemented it in a large number of countries 
(including Armenia, Croatia, Jordan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). For an overview, 
see http://www.jeaustin.com/001.html.
72. IDB, ‘Competitiveness: Strategy Document’ (Washington, DC: IDB, 2003).
Fougner: Neoliberal Governance of States 
 323
 disciplined in the same direction by organisations such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. Irrespective of the source of neoliberal governance 
within states, it should also be clear that we are not witnessing a com-
plete standardisation of such governance. Rather, efforts to govern the 
national economy in accordance with a neoliberal rationality of govern-
ment tend to be affected by the specific local context.73 Furthermore, even 
in states that appear to be neoliberal all the way through, it would be an 
exaggeration to say that it is all neoliberalism and nothing else. Against 
this background, it is more accurate to talk about intra-state governance 
being neoliberalised or moving in a neoliberal direction.74
Governance within states aside, I will conclude with some reflections 
on the future of the broader issue of neoliberal governance of states. In 
this connection, it makes sense to revisit the conditions postulated by pub-
lic choice theorists for locational competition to be played to best effect. 
Regarding the availability of relevant and comparable information about 
different locations, it is reasonable to assume that the production of such 
information will continue to grow. With a steady increase in the number of 
publications assessing, comparing and ranking national business environ-
ments, the potential problem related to this condition is likely to concern 
an oversupply rather than undersupply of the information in question. 
This has been recognised by the World Bank, which is now providing a 
‘one-stop guide to business environment indicators’ for most countries.75 
While a potential ‘information overload’ can complicate the ability of 
actors to make (re)locational decisions, it need not impact on locational 
competition as such – for the simple reason that such competition depends 
more on exit being an option, than the exit option being used.
With regard to the freedom of production factors and products/ 
services to enter and leave locations, there are no clear indications of 
either a move towards complete locational freedom, or a significant 
reversal of the locational freedom that already exists. However, popular 
discontent with the free flow of products, services and capital has grown 
markedly since the mid-1990s, and a continuation of this trend may well 
pose a significant challenge to the neoliberal governance of states. In this 
 connection, it should be pointed out that the economic globalisation of 
the past few decades has been internal to a governmental project aimed 
73. Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz and Philip G. Cerny, eds, Internaliz-
ing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of 
 Capitalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
74. Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck, ‘Making global rules: Globalization or neoli-
beralization?’, in Remaking the Global Economy: Economic-Geographical Perspectives, 
eds Jamie Peck and Henry Wai-chung Yeung (London: Sage, 2003), 163–81.
75. World Bank, ‘Business Environment Snapshots’ (http://rru.worldbank.
org/besnapshots). The guide includes the World Bank’s own Doing Business 
reports, as well as other influential indices such as the Heritage Foundation’s 
Index of Economic Freedom.
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not merely at constituting a ‘global marketplace’ for corporations, but 
also at structuring the action field of governments – by limiting their 
interfe rence with cross-border economic flows, deepening inter-state 
economic (inter)dependencies, and engaging them in competition for 
economic activity. Although a further strengthening of the opposition 
to the  contemporary form of neoliberal globalisation need not result in 
deglobalisation, attempts to reform global economic governance in a 
non-neoliberal direction are also likely to have significant implications 
for locational competition among states.
Regarding the prevention of regulatory cartels, negative non-market 
externalities and strategic state behaviour, and though it cannot be ruled 
out that a rule system for locational competition might evolve ‘slowly 
over time in a Hayekian process’,76 there is not much today to indicate 
that states are about to write off significant amounts of legal sovereignty 
for the sake of making locational competition more efficient and stable. 
As argued in the present article, however, the absence of supranational 
rules and enforcement mechanisms does not prevent governments from 
being induced to behave competitively through less formal and less dis-
ciplinary mechanisms. Importantly, governments are not only guided to 
behave in such a way by actions on the part of various external actors, but 
have increasingly come to constitute and act on themselves and their citi-
zens as competitive and entrepreneurial market subjects through national 
competitiveness councils, national competitiveness reports, investment 
promotion agencies, national benchmarking exercises, and the like.
In spite of this, it must be recognised both that all states are not equally 
engaged in locational competition, and that a concern with national com-
petitiveness does not guide all conduct even in states otherwise geared 
towards it. While the former largely depends on the extent to which a 
particular state is integrated into the globalising world economy, the lat-
ter points to some possible limits to locational competition. In this con-
nection, a link can feasibly be made to what Philip Cerny has referred 
to as two potential crises related to states being constituted as ‘competi-
tion states’. One of these crises concerns the erosion of ‘the conceptions 
of common interest and community which have legitimated the institu-
tional authority of the nation-state over the past several centuries’ as a 
result of the quest for national competitiveness leading to ‘the demotion 
of the state to a mere pragmatic association for common ends’.77 Second, 
in spite of how some public choice theorists promote locational competi-
tion in the name of democracy, it is possible to talk about a potential crisis 
of democracy as we know it – partly as a result of government policies 
being increasingly guided by a concern with the perceived interests of 
mobile and exit-prone firms and production factors, and partly because 
76. Siebert, ‘Locational Competition’, 155.
77. Philip G. Cerny, ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of 
 Political Globalization’, Government and Opposition 32, no. 2 (1997): 254–5.
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of the emergence of ‘a new and potentially undemocratic role … for the 
state as the enforcer of decisions and/or outcomes which emerge from 
world markets’ or centres of authority external to the state.78
This said, neither of these potential crises will necessarily be  actua lised. 
Regarding the potential crisis of community, it would be premature to 
rule out the possibility of the ‘economic logic’ of selling a country to 
mobile firms and production factors being successfully complemented 
with a ‘social logic’ through which immobile citizens are given a sense of 
communal belonging.79 In this connection, it is interesting to note that the 
discourse of national competitiveness has become increasingly central to 
contemporary processes of identity construction and community build-
ing at both state and regional levels.80 With regard to the potential crisis 
of democracy, it can be noted that democratic practices have always been 
subjected to constraints, and that it would be premature to rule out the 
possibility of economic globalisation and locational competition being 
constituted as seemingly apolitical or natural constraints within which 
democracy is practised.
The future prospects for neoliberal governance of states are likely to 
be influenced also by the economic effects of locational competition. In 
this connection, it can initially be noted that its costs and benefits are 
likely to be unevenly distributed both between and within states. In spite 
of claims to the contrary, all states and their citizens cannot win out in 
locational competition, and there are likely to be limits to how long the 
promise of success can be successfully held out to the losers. While it is 
commonly argued that the worst thing for a country today is to fall by 
the wayside in relation to developments in the world economy, there is 
likely to be a point at which that wayside is preferable to the downside 
of locational competition. Moreover, a world characterised by locational 
competition is geared towards the provision of favourable conditions 
for mobile firms and production factors and, in contrast with the latter’s 
‘exit’ option, immobile forces can increasingly come to use their ‘voice’ 
option in attempts to move government policies in a different direc-
tion –  especially in countries experiencing the downside of locational 
 competition.
The sense that locational competition is far from all good opens up 
the possibility of governments joining forces in an attempt either to limit 
78. Ibid., 258.
79. On these logics, see Chris Philo and Gerry Kearns, ‘Culture, History, 
 Capital: A Critical Introduction to the Selling of Places’, in Selling Places: The City 
as Cultural Capital, Past and Present, eds Gerry Kearns and Chris Philo (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1993), 3.
80. George T. Crane, ‘Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back in’, 
Millennium 27, no. 1 (1998): 55–75; Ben Rosamond, ‘Imagining the European 
 Economy: “Competitiveness” and the Social Construction of “Europe” as an 
 Economic Space’, New Political Economy 7, no. 2 (2002): 157–77.
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or put an end to it. An interesting case in point is the OECD’s Harmful 
Tax Competition Initiative of 1998. This case is interesting not because it 
posed a fundamental challenge to locational competition; it did not, as it 
‘acknowledged the importance of tax competition in disciplining profli-
gate governments and promoting a favourable climate for  investment’, 
and merely addressed a few specific tax practices considered to be 
 ‘harmful’.81 Nor is the case interesting because it had a significant impact 
on locational competition; it did not, as it was ‘sabotaged by the world’s 
most powerful single actor, the United States’.82 Rather, the case is inte-
resting both because it became a case at all, and because it did so within 
an organisation centrally involved in the promotion of economic globa-
lisation and locational competition. As the latter intensifies, it is far from 
inconceivable that the sentiments underpinning the case can gain force 
and engender more comprehensive efforts aimed at constraining loca-
tional competition.
While it is futile to try to predict the future of neoliberal governance 
of states, studies that draw attention to the power and politics internal 
to economic globalisation and locational competition can potentially 
contribute to render such governance problematic, as well as to open up 
a space of imaginative possibility between the present and the future. 
There is nothing natural or given about states striving to improve their 
so-called national competitiveness, and no matter how often we are told 
‘it is about competitiveness, stupid’, what might qualify as ‘stupidity’ 
can perhaps more properly be located in the tendency to take for granted 
what is but a neoliberal project of government.
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